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This Is Tomorrow! 
Becoming a Consumer in the Soviet Sixties 
Susan E. Reid 
Suppose that, at the dawn of the 1960s, Soviet artist Aleksandr Laktionov had produced an updated 
remake of his well-known painting of 1952, Moving into the New Apartment (fig. 1.1), to reflect the 
hopes of the new decade: how might it have looked? In the intervening years Stalin had died and been 
denounced, the Cold War had entered a new phase of “peaceful competition,” and, in 1957, the 
Khrushchev regime had launched its industrialized construction program to provide separate apartments 
not only for exemplary citizens like Laktionov’s happy house-warmer but for all. Other measures 
promised further improvements in ordinary people’s lives: enhanced services, more leisure time, and 
increased production of consumer goods to go in their new homes.1 One change that Laktionov’s sixties 
remake would surely have to reflect was that the ideal modern Soviet home was now widely envisaged 
as saturated with “labor-saving” technology and as already looking forward to the next generation of 
new improved devices. As Izvestiia proclaimed in 1959, with a dose of socialist realism: “Today many 
families have a washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and floor polisher. The majority of workers have a 
meat grinder, juicer, etc. But it would be much more convenient to combine them in a single ‘domestic 
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combine’ [domashnii kombinat].”2 
<FIG. 1.1 ABOUT HERE> 
Despite these significant additions to the pile of possessions that marked Laktionov’s family as 
modern, urbane citizens, his hypothetical 1962 remake probably would not have looked much like the 
collage that British Pop artist Richard Hamilton made to publicize a London avant-garde art exhibition 
This Is Tomorrow in 1956. Entitled Just What Is It That Makes Today’s Homes So Different, So 
Appealing?, the collage commented both on contemporary American consumer culture’s self-
representations and on how the brave new world of mass consumption was seen from 1950s Britain, just 
emerging from postwar austerity.3  Appropriating the visual style and iconography of American 
advertising and comics, Hamilton identified the shape of “Tomorrow” with the phenomena British 
writer and social critic J. B. Priestley in the previous year had labeled (more judgmentally) “admass.”4 
“Tomorrow”—the sixties—would be a realm of images and styles; it would be overstuffed with mass 
consumer goods, pervaded by the media, and dominated by the entertainment industry. Domestic 
appliances—represented in Hamilton’s image by television, a tape recorder, and a vacuum cleaner, cut 
out from an ad complete with hyperbolic strap line—appear as signature artifacts of postwar modernity 
alongside comics, the sexualized body, and canned food. 
Why begin a chapter on Soviet consumer culture of the sixties with a British 1950s view of a 
chimerical Americanized “Tomorrow”? The title of this book, The Socialist Sixties, calls for a 
comparative, transnational perspective and a reconsideration of the system specificity of the term sixties. 
What does it mean to qualify it with the adjective socialist, producing a seemingly incongruous and even 
oxymoronic hybrid, socialist sixties? Sixties is not merely the chronological label for the decade between 
the 1950s and the 1970s; it evokes a whole nexus of concepts, images, values, and social phenomena 
that together constitute a new consumerist stage of modernity, generally identified with capitalism. 
When we say sixties in English we think of the affluent society, the never-had-it-so-good generation of 
growing mass consumerism, hedonism, and leisure, youth culture and style, and the iconic commodities 
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of the consumer boom. Observing this culture as it emerged, Hamilton characterized it in 1957: “Popular 
(designed for a mass audience, Transient (short term solution), Expendable (easily forgotten), Low-Cost, 
Mass Produced, Young (aimed at youth), Witty, Sexy, Gimmicky, Glamorous, Big Business.”5 The term 
does not translate straightforwardly into Russian, however. For members of the Russian intelligentsia 
(both former Soviet and émigré), the term shestidesiatniki (sixties generation) traditionally references 
the critical intelligentsia of the 1860s and only secondarily its echoes in the intellectual ferment of the 
Thaw a century later. Both are characterized by high-minded seriousness and a self-defining ascetic 
disdain for material pleasures in favor of high culture and spiritual values. Thus there are cultural as well 
as systemic differences in the connotations of the term. The collocation socialist sixties invites us to 
consider how the socialist experience of late industrial modernity corresponds to or departs from 
paradigms that have been developed for understanding the Western, capitalist phenomenon, and thereby 
also to question the hegemony of a model of modernity defined in terms of occidental capitalism. 
As with any such period, we can argue over the start and end dates.6 In the USA, the sixties 
began in the mid-1950s, arriving not much later in Western Europe. Priestley coined his neologism 
admass in 1955.7 This was also the turning point when major U.S. corporations definitively changed 
their marketing strategies, investing on an unprecedented scale in the visual aspects of design to induce 
people to spend—and keep on spending—their increasing incomes. While the rise of “merchandising”—
creating a “new role for design in producing obsolescence and panic for status”—had begun already in 
the interwar period, as C. Wright Mills observed in 1958, it was in the postwar period that “the 
distributor becomes ascendant over both the consumer and the producer. . . . The salesman becomes 
paramount.”8 Consummating the innovations of the interwar period, such as the work of General Motors 
designer Harley Earl, the mid-1950s brought, according to Thomas Hine, “sleek, powerful, finny low-
priced cars and the emergence of a sexy, urgent new kind of popular music—rock and roll.”9 The 
product was henceforth designed as if it were an advertisement, selling not only itself but much more: a 
lifestyle and social status.10 A new aesthetic of everyday life emerged, in which image, display, and the 
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perfection of surface were paramount.11 The attention to image entailed functionally redundant 
flourishes such as tailfins, which signified speed, fun, pleasure in consumption, hedonism, and luxury 
for all. Dubbing this “Populuxe,” Hine explains: “‘Populuxe’ contains a thoroughly unnecessary ‘e,’ to 
give it class. That final embellishment of a practical and straightforward invention is what makes the 
word Populuxe, well, Populuxe.”12 
This was also the time when, in the capitalist West, industrial design was consolidated as a 
specialist practice with distinctive functions and methods. A vital role was played by professional 
designers and image makers in shaping the sixties. They branded the decade so powerfully that we are 
still in thrall to its self-styled image. As Dick Hebdige put it retrospectively, “From now on, the shape 
and look of things were to play an important part in aligning two potentially divergent interests: 
production for profit, and consumption for pleasure.”13 The sixties saw the realization of a longer 
process: “the intercession of the image between the consumer and the act of consumption.”14 For Jean 
Baudrillard, consumption not so much of the use value of goods as of their sign value was a defining 
characteristic of modern (and postmodern) life under capitalism.15 Hamilton, reflecting on the emergent 
phenomena, uses the representations produced by commercial mass culture and their visual styles as the 
material of art—placing a world of signs, media images, and mass culture between the perceiving 
subject and nature—to represent the bombardment of visual images, packaging, advertising, hedonism, 
popular culture, glamour, sex.16 Thus, in his collage, the canned ham, perched self-importantly on the 
coffee table like some modern fetish, represents not the nutrition value of the food it contains but its 
image and its sign value. 
Sovuluxe or “an Oppressive Pile of Hardware”? 
All this is surely poles apart from the Soviet material and visual culture of the 1960s, the concerns of 
Soviet planners, and the dour image of the USSR as viewed from the Western side of the Iron Curtain? 
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If “the sixties” is a brand in itself, an image that comes between human consciousness and material 
existence, the image of the Soviet sixties is its opposite—not the Real Thing, not deserving the brand 
mark, with its connotations of swinging modernity, style, superabundance, sex, and fun. Could Populuxe 
have any place in the Soviet culture of goods and their presentation? 
Not according to contemporary Western observers. When exposed in the international arena at 
expositions and world’s fairs of the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet goods and their presentation were judged 
not to have made it into the sixties. Hamilton’s associate, UK critic Lawrence Alloway, articulated the 
salient differences between socialist things and capitalist commodities, dismissing the USSR’s 
presentation of material abundance at recent international exhibitions as “a spectacle with a message,” 
overloaded with “garrulous, cumulative weight, ungraspable profusion to convey plenitude.”17 At the 
Soviet Trade Fair in London 1961, “the rising level of consumption in the USSR was demonstrated 
clearly and repeatedly, but not entirely happily. Despite the fashion show, despite a modern flat hung 
over the model of a modern city, the exhibition repeatedly failed to give a convincing image of the 
leisure in which the benefits of consumption are enjoyed.”18 
Merely to present an abundance of things was not enough, in Alloway’s view; it was the extra, 
redundant flourishes that mattered—the “e” on “Populuxe,” as Hine put it. Consumer goods represented 
for Alloway a baseline of civilized living, but sixties affluence required goods not only to use but to 
enjoy and desire, to fashion lifestyles, and to play with. Although the Soviet Union had placeholders for 
such items, it had missed the point of consumer goods: “The entertainment, the styling that goes with 
mass-produced consumer goods is part of their value and function. The Russians, however, by denying 
themselves sophistication, just as they eschew advertising, reduced the fruits of peace to an oppressive 
pile of hardware in a bower of statistics.”19 In paying too little attention to the fun, fantasy, and magic 
that resided in styling, advertising, and packaging, Soviet consumer goods merely fulfilled a function, 
remaining utilitarian things, not objects of desire. The semiotics of consumer goods was still missing.20 
Such views, mapping the opposition between sign value and use value onto the 
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capitalism/socialism antithesis, are undoubtedly structured by Cold War polarities. These were projected 
conceptually onto goods and materials, supposing a First and a Second World of artifacts. While, from 
the Soviet perspective, capitalist commodities embodied excess, redundancy, and designed 
obsolescence, aiming to create “panic for status” and desires for unnecessary things, for Western 
observers the nature, circulation, and meanings of socialist goods were defined by shortage, uniformity, 
the bare satisfaction of basic need, and practices of repair and using up.26  
Yet Alloway’s criticisms cannot be discounted out of hand for systemic bias.21 The dichotomy he 
outlined may be observed in relation to science fiction “houses of the future,” such as the playful 
dwelling designed by Hamilton’s colleagues Alison and Peter Smithson for the Daily Mail Ideal Home 
Exhibition in 1956, or Monsanto’s plastic house installed at Disneyland, California (1957–68).22 The 
Soviets also fantasized about polymer power and all-electric homes of the future and even built their 
own plastic house of the future in 1958.23 But judging from photographs taken in 1963, the Soviet model 
was as dour and drab as Cold War stereotypes would have one expect. Fun, glamour, and mass 
entertainment were not its purpose; it was a serious scientific experiment for specialists to study, and the 
interior was furnished with sober, modernist good taste in the “contemporary style.”24 
While there was, of course, a pervasive image culture in the Soviet Union, its object, according 
to conventional wisdom, was to promote communism not commodities, and rational consumption rather 
than consumerist lifestyles. Although ideological hostility toward the idea of fashion softened in the 
Khrushchev era, public rhetoric still vilified planned obsolescence and commodity fetishism as evils of 
capitalism and added to this a moral, aesthetic, and economic condemnation of “superfluity” (referring 
both to luxury and excess and to the Stalinist overemphasis on ornate facades and surface appearances at 
the expense of functionality).25 
The systemic opposition is not the whole story, however. Not only did indigenous critics of 
burgeoning consumerism exist in the West (and not solely on the left), but attitudes were also changing 
among state bureaucracies and other authorities in the Soviet Union, partly as an effect of contact with 
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international practices, which had increased significantly since the early 1950s. Some at least of the 
planners of the Soviet section at the 1958 Brussels World’s Fair, for instance, were convinced that an 
emphasis on individual enjoyment of the fruits of progress, presented in a fun, dynamic, and engaging 
manner, was the best way to sell the Soviet “brand” abroad.27 The shortcomings of finish and detailing, 
for which Western experts criticized Soviet consumer goods, were also recognized in the USSR. 
Beginning in the late 1950s, there were moves to develop new specialisms such as industrial or product 
design, drawing energetically both on Western expertise and on that of socialist Eastern Europe. The 
visual aspects of design, the aesthetics of commodities and packaging, marketing and branding, all 
became matters of concern in the 1960s.28 When a new model of plastic house was developed in 1962, 
the so-called Leningrad House (designed by Lenproekt), it was an experimental transparent pod on a 
pedestal, with futuristic dwelling possibilities for transformation and interaction by the user—such as 
modular extension and a variable composition—and more than a nod to Monsanto. While increased 
international communication and competition may be part of the explanation for these shifts, I want to 
suggest that they also reflect a growing concern with the nature and interests of consumers, which 
played a part in the production of a modern form of consumption and new Soviet consumer 
consciousness. Albeit with a half decade’s time lag, the Soviet Union was also entering the sixties. 
To unsettle the binary order of things and open up questions about Soviet styling and 
marketing—about the attention to the surface design and image of consumer goods that would render 
them “objects of desire”—I follow Hamilton’s lead in focusing on domestic appliances. The 
normalization of these new consumer durables that began to become available in the long Soviet sixties 
was part of the modernizing state’s project to channel and direct the people’s image of socialist 
modernity: to shape their horizons of expectation and actual lifestyles in ways that were considered 
commensurate with the USSR’s position as an advanced industrial power and leader of the socialist 
world and which were expected to promote the attainment of full communism. But there were aspects of 
the styling of some appliances that transcended, eluded, or even contradicted the demands of rational 
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socialist objects. Elsewhere I have attended to efforts, in the Khrushchev era, to shape demand in 
particular ways, focusing in particular on those that sought to contain demand within “rational” norms.29 
Here I turn, rather, to what I propose was a key development in the formation of a Soviet consumer 
culture in the sixties, beginning already under Khrushchev: the production of a need for new types of 
goods. 
This chapter draws on research for a larger project about homemaking and becoming a consumer 
in the Soviet sixties, in which I use archival and published sources, both textual and visual, in 
combination with over seventy oral history interviews to excavate changing practices and attitudes 
toward homemaking, taste, and consumption.30 The project examines the negotiations and 
accommodations between specialist discourses and practices and those of lay consumers and 
homemakers with regard to the new one-family apartments erected at speed on a mass scale beginning in 
the late 1950s: between the anonymous structures conceived by architects and planners and the agency 
of individuals who made home in them. The growing authority of specialists in determining the minutiae 
of everyday lives, which has been identified as one of modernity’s hallmarks, is a significant part of the 
story of the Soviet sixties.31 Here I focus on professional image makers and designers, but I also want to 
ask what part was played by ordinary consumers. In Western product design a vital role was recognized 
for consumer research: “Let the Consumer help,” as leading first generation industrial designer in the 
U.S., Harold Van Doren, put it in the 1954 edition of his manual for the new profession, Industrial 
Design.1 The final section draws on appliance consumption biographies in the interview material to 
suggest answers to the question “Who made the Soviet sixties?” 
I shall address three aspects: first, the meanings of appliances, both in contemporary 
authoritative discourse in the global Cold War context (the circulation of images “advertising” an 
appliance-enhanced lifestyle as a universally accessible socialist modernity) and as a way for the 
                                                 
1 Harold Van Doren, Industrial Design: A Practical Guide to Product Design and Development, second 
edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), 271-92. 
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historian to trace social and cultural changes in consumption and living standards; second, the growing 
role of specialists, the professionalization of Soviet design and attention to styling matters and the Soviet 
“brand”: and finally, the need to create a need. 
Why Appliances? 
Appliances are of historical interest for what they tell us both about objective changes in living standards 
and about shifting cultural attitudes toward consumption. Durables consumption can serve as an 
economic measure of rising living standards and index of the increasing spending power of the Soviet 
populace. According to Engel’s law of economics (ca. 1870), different types of commodities are 
affected in different ways by increases in disposable income: the balance of household expenditure shifts 
from the perishable—the contents of the refrigerator, which will be eaten up—to the durable: the 
refrigerator itself. In 1962 M. E. Ruban, analyzing changes in consumption patterns since 1940, found 
that this shift from food to durables was becoming apparent in the USSR, indicating the increased 
purchasing power of the Soviet public, as well as significant improvements in the supply of goods to the 
population.32 Other foreign observers remarked on the signs of growing prosperity and consumption 
levels in the midsixties, as refrigerator production doubled in two years from 1964 to 1966 and 
consumer durables began to be acquired by most Soviet families.33 Statistics indicate that appliances 
became a normal requirement for the modern Soviet home in the course of the long 1960s. In 1960, half 
of Soviet households still lacked basic durable goods, only 4 percent owned a refrigerator or washing 
machine, and 8 percent a TV. But the proportion of Soviet households with refrigerators grew rapidly 
over the next decade, rising to 11 percent in 1965 and 65 percent by 1975, while television ownership 
rose to 24 percent and then 74 percent in the same period.34 A letter to the editors of Ekonomicheskaia 
gazeta at the end of 1962 reproduced the new, modernized image of a “typical” (in the socialist realist 
sense that it represented a desired tendency of development) Soviet lifestyle and implied a causal 
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connection between the move to a new apartment and the modernizing process of becoming a consumer: 
Living conditions rise year by year, and, along with them, so do demands. Many receive new apartments 
to which not everyone takes along their domestic things that previously satisfied them, but often they try 
to acquire new furnishings. Going around town one can confirm that in every block there are many who 
have refrigerators, radios, televisions, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and other items of primary 
necessity. . . . These items have firmly entered our everyday life and are already not considered to be 
luxury objects.35 
The purchase of electrical household appliances had additional significance over and above that of 
nonfood durables consumption in general, because these were entirely new types of commodities for 
individual use in the home. It marked a change, rather than more of the same.36 Marshall Goldman 
defined the significance of the shifts in 1968: 
The purchase of a washer or other appliances where there was none before is a major improvement. Many 
Soviet families have heretofore been living on a loaf-to-loaf basis; the bulk of their purchases have been 
for the purpose of sustaining life. Until the late 1950s there was little income left over for consumer goods 
of a more durable nature. Then the Soviet consumer’s income increased so that he was able to spend 
money on products that generated enjoyment long after the initial purchase. Unlike a loaf of bread, a 
Soviet refrigerator provides consumptive pleasure for more than a few days. Thus an index of 
consumption which measures only current sales understates the enormous improvement that is taking 
place in the daily life of the Soviet consumer.37 
The appearance of major appliances in people’s homes thus marked a transition to a modern form of 
consumption and a qualitatively different lifestyle, associated with the purchase and accumulation of 
industrially produced consumer goods and, in Goldman’s terms, with enduring “consumptive 
pleasure.”38 
This new lifestyle was also directly associated with the mass housing program launched in 1957, 
which provided millions of families with separate apartments with kitchens and “mod. cons.” As the 
Ekonomicheskaia gazeta reader indicated, the move to new apartments figured in public discourse as a 
legitimate stimulant to consumption. The move also represented the modernization of living conditions 
in quite concrete ways: for many, a refrigerator and even more a washing machine was thinkable only 
after the move, since the housing they came from often lacked mains electricity or plumbing.39 
Thus appliances are of special significance for the historian of this period. They also had 
meanings in contemporary public discourse. If, as Baudrillard proposes, it is a defining characteristic of 
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consumer society that in buying an appliance one buys signs rather than functions, then a demonstrable 
shift in this direction—in the ways people account for their purchases and in the social meanings of their 
durables—could be a means to calibrate the Soviet transformation into a consumer culture, in which, I 
propose, the 1960s were the watershed. 
It was the refrigerator that became the key symbol of a new, affluent lifestyle in Europe, 
beginning in the 1950s, combining in a single image the promise of abundance with technological 
modernity.40 Hamilton used it in another work, $he (1958-61, Tate), where he conflated it with other 
objects of desire, whose visual language of advertising he also appropriated: the car, electric toaster, and 
reified, pinup woman’s body. According to Baudrillard’s definition of consumer societies, the 
refrigerator was important not only for its chilling properties but for its position in a semiotic system 
representing consumer affluence. In the capitalist West, the purchase of this signifier, the refrigerator, 
invoked a whole lifestyle characterized by the consumption of images rather than objects and a whole 
constellation of meanings encompassed by supermarkets, suburban homes, televisions, and the family 
automobile.41 
Domestic appliances were thus a key signifier of consumer society. They were also iconic 
images in the Cold War struggle over representations of modernity and mass prosperity, as was made 
clear by the “kitchen debate” between Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev, which took place at the 
American National Exhibition in Moscow 1959 amid the “labor-saving” appliances of a lemon-yellow 
General Electric kitchen. In the less confrontational international climate of “peaceful coexistence,” 
vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, televisions, and other appliances staked a claim for the advanced nature 
of state socialism and its ability to benefit ordinary people.42 Both camps claimed that domestic 
technology could alleviate women’s domestic drudgery and ascribed to it modernizing and liberating 
effects on the user, but the socialist bloc went further, claiming for it the power to promote a higher form 
of emancipation. In combination with expanded and improved services, appliances would help to free 
women from “kitchen slavery” for full self-realization in the public sphere, thereby enabling them to 
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become fully rounded individuals and ultimately hastening the advent of communism.43 Shortly after 
Whirlpool’s futuristic “Miracle Kitchen” was seen at the American Exhibition complete with robotic 
“maid,” the women’s magazine Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker) published a cartoon where a man presents 
his wife with a domestic robot, a “housework aggregate” (domrabochii agregat) (fig. 1.2). The caption 
established a direct relation between space exploration and the quality of women’s life, ending: “A joke? 
No. Rockets are flying. . . . We promise that these dreams will also soon come true!” Appliances were 
rockets for housewives, a gift to women for managing their double burden, whereby they too would 
have their share of the Space Age. 
<FIG. 1.2 ABOUT HERE> 
A shift took place in the symbols, style, and mode of circulation of representations of the good 
life during the 1960s. Prosperity and abundance were no longer represented by the cornucopia or sheaf 
of corn but by a large streamlined refrigerator, overflowing with processed foods (fig. 1.3). 44 The 
technological modernization of the iconography of the good life was complemented by a shift from oil 
painting toward the mass-reproducible medium of photography, with its rhetoric of documentary truth, 
presentness, and modernity—one reason why Laktionov would not have been a good choice of visual 
professional to define the image of the new prosperity of the Soviet sixties. Household encyclopedias 
and manuals displayed the latest range of Soviet appliances attended by smiling, well-turned-out women 
in poses similar to the stance of “affectionate genuflexion” that Hamilton identified in Western 
advertising (although the differences should also be noted, the Soviet ones being less youthful and 
seductive and displaying less naked flesh) (fig. 1.4).45 Such imagery offered new modern identities to 
Soviet women and new models of domesticity. 
<FIG. 1.3 AND FIG. 1.4 ABOUT HERE> 
A range of public discourses identified appliances in the home with cultured Soviet modernity 
and with social status. A satirical cartoon in a 1958 issue of Krokodil draws its humor and critical 
resonance from this context. It characterizes a corrupt manager as petit bourgeois by representing his 
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material attributes. His office is more like a boudoir than a workspace, complete with chandeliers, potted 
palms, gilt mirrors, ornate furniture, and heavy drapes, but also with a large curvilinear ZIL refrigerator 
and a Ruban television set (the prestigious brands are named in the accompanying text). The manager 
justifies filling his office with luxury consumer goods and home comforts by appropriating the terms of 
authoritative discourse; it is required by his status, he says, “to keep in step with life. Furthermore, it sets 
an example to others; it is visual agitation for the cultured way of life.” As a boss he is expected to be 
“an educator of good taste and good tone, a conductor of culture to the masses.”46 
That Krokodil could use the image of the refrigerator and television in this way (even if 
satirically) indicates that, however limited their actual penetration into homes in 1958, they had already 
accrued social meanings with broad enough currency among the magazine’s readership. These meanings 
exceeded (or even contradicted) the use value of the machines; they were signs of being modern and 
“cultured.” The cartoon also conveys acceptance of the idea that appliance acquisition was not a given; 
rather, it had to be modeled, advertised to others, to propagate the modern lifestyle—a point to which we 
return below. 
Thus Soviet citizens were already living amid images of consumer goods and a corresponding 
lifestyle, which circulated even before the durables themselves entered their homes and daily routines. 
Even as public discourse and visual culture propagated a consumption morality based on self-restraint, 
moderation, and the satisfaction of “rational” needs, and warned against acquisitiveness and commodity 
fetishism, specialists acknowledged that the definition of “rational consumption” was not fixed for all 
time and that the boundary between luxury and necessity could shift. As the Ekonomicheskaia gazeta 
reader above presented as a matter of course, consumer entitlement and rational consumption norms 
were dynamic; they would develop and become differentiated as the economy grew.47 This potential for 
development had implications for two related sixties practices and new specialisms, more commonly 
identified with the capitalist West: market research—information gathering about consumer demand; 
and marketing—creating a need through design, image, branding, and associations with a desired 
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lifestyle. 
The Soviet Brand: Professionalization of Industrial 
Design 
The rhetorical connotations of appliances that were produced in public discourse—associating Soviet byt 
with Space Age science, progress, and abundance—were reinforced, in some cases, by their visual 
appearance. We turn here to what Van Doren would call the “millinery” aspect of design or “styling” of 
the external appearance of these commodities—the aspect to which so much attention was paid in the 
West in the long sixties.2 
In the Soviet Union industrial design was in its infancy and the term dizain was not yet used 
except to refer to foreign practice. The socialist culture of goods was differentiated rhetorically from the 
capitalist along systemic lines similar to those drawn by Alloway, but with the valences inverted. Thus a 
1965 article accused: “Knowing the psychology of the consumer and his tastes and moods, [Western] 
firms often create an illusory impression of high quality in their products by means of their 
corresponding ‘styling’ [oformleniia].”48 The purpose of styling, as of advertising, was to trick the 
consumer into buying unnecessary or poor-quality things, “speculating on his lack of expertise and 
human weakness.”49 While capitalist commodities deceived and let one down, Soviet products were 
rational and transparent. Their surfaces could be trusted to reflect their substance with no sleight of 
hand. “Soviet means durable and reliable [prochnyii].”50 This was the Soviet “brand.” And it seems to 
have been quite effective; in interviews in the mid-2000s many of my informants spoke of their Soviet 
appliances like trusty old friends, ascribing to them such characteristics as endurance and reliability, 
qualities they considered lacking in postsocialist goods.51 
Market research began to occupy a range of Soviet specialists in the early 1960s, in association 
                                                 
2 Van Doren, Industrial Design, 17. 
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with economic reformism (indeed, the 1965 article above was a survey of Western approaches to market 
research). Its purpose was also differentiated: while in capitalist countries studies of consumer demand 
were all directed toward stimulating profit, under socialism their purpose was to support central 
planning and enable production to meet popular requirements more efficiently. Moreover, this was to be 
achieved, not by “blindly following the consumer, but by educating his aesthetic taste.”52 Whereas in the 
West the vulgar excesses that Populuxe epitomized were the result of pandering to popular desire for 
luxury, in the Soviet Union marketing and product design had a pedagogical, enlightenment role to play 
in the formation of the conscious, all-round Soviet person, developing his or her rational and aesthetic 
faculties. 
The aesthetics of machines also became a matter of concern among Soviet specialists by 1960 as 
part of a reengagement with international modernist issues. Architects, artists, engineers, and 
philosophers debated such questions as “Can a machine be a work of art?” The design journal 
Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR (Decorative Art of the USSR), founded in 1957, published many an article 
on this issue, printing one discussion of machine aesthetics under a photograph of the Soviet limousine, 
the ZIL-111, complete with tailfins.53 Specialists took great interest in contemporary design education 
(both in the West and in Eastern Europe), and in its history, including excavating the theory and practice 
of the Russian constructivists and VKhUTEMAS, and of the Bauhaus.54 They lobbied for industrial 
design (although it was not yet called this) to be recognized as a distinct discipline requiring specialist 
training and central institutions that would bestow professional accreditation and control standards, and 
for aesthetic experts to be more involved in production and given greater authority in factories.55 
The emerging profession of Soviet design, or at least of its theoretical branch known as 
“technical aesthetics,” was institutionalized with the formation of the All-Union Institute of Technical 
Aesthetics (VNIITE) by a Council of Ministers decree of 28 April 1962.56 Discussions about product 
design, production aesthetics, industrial graphics, and the professionalization of the visual world of 
goods also went on in artists’ organizations and government bodies.57 The All-Union Institute of 
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Assortment of Light Industry (ViaLegProm), set up under Gosplan USSR in 1944, along with special 
design bureaux for “industrial aesthetics,” attended, in the late 1950s, to the branding (markirovka) of 
products and design of trademarks, packaging, and labels.58 Foreign expertise on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain was also studied. In the socialist bloc, the German Democratic Republic was the acknowledged 
leader in branding, but Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had other important lessons to teach.59 So 
did the West. The growing foreign exchanges of experts that were a feature of the late 1950s included 
architects, designers, and design education specialists, for example from Britain’s Royal College of Art 
and Council of Industrial Design.60 As Larissa Zakharova has also found with regard to Soviet fashion 
design in this period, the new professionals were anxious to prove themselves against international 
standards, which, for them, transcended the Cold War divide.61 
Theoreticians of technical aesthetics also recognized the need to make appliances more attractive 
in appearance. Their stated reasons for attending to the aesthetics of appliances were system specific, 
based on Marxist materialist philosophy and on the close relation between ethical and aesthetic 
education in the formation of the future communist person. Attention to the aesthetics of the machine 
was not about selling goods through false claims to quality, nor about designing obsolescence so that the 
“panic for status” would force consumers to keep replacing their still functioning appliances. Rather, it 
was about enhancing the aesthetic level of the everyday material environment, for beauty would not only 
save the world but educate the new person and help bring about communism. A well-designed handle on 
a spade made possible the all-round person envisaged by Marx, able to labor manually in the morning 
yet play the violin in the evening.62 Domestic appliances had a specific role, for refrigerators or 
television sets would stand, permanently visible, in the home, and the aesthetics of the domestic interior 
were regarded as a major culture-building project of the Khrushchev era.63 
Rationality and honesty—moral principles—were key to the socialist aesthetic, just as they were 
to Western modernism. “What is the beauty of appliances?” asked Dekorativnoe iskusstvo. Reporting in 
1962 on the public reception of an exhibition of domestic appliances at VDNKh (the All-Union 
 18
Exhibition of Economic Achievements), it distinguished among Soviet refrigerators on aesthetic 
grounds: the compact model, Sever’, produced by the Moscow Gas Appliances factory; the Ukraina 
from Kiev, with its “convenient smooth external surface”; and “the famous Oka, object of many 
housewives’ dreams.” “But the greatest number of visitors are around the rotating stand of an apartment 
interior, in whose kitchen a wall-mounted refrigerator of the ZIL brand is installed. Here lies perhaps the 
answer to the question about the beauty of consumer goods. They should be maximally fit for purpose 
and minimally obtrusive.”64 A simple, modest, but commodious rectilinear box, the latest model of ZIL 
best answered this rationalist demand that form should follow function, with none of the redundant, 
attention-grabbing elaborations essential to Populuxe.65 
The design of domestic appliances as well as of industrial machines was regularly discussed in 
VNIITE’s specialist journal Tekhnicheskaia estetika (Technical Aesthetics) (fig. 1.5). Typically, 
a 1965 report—presenting research conducted by VNIITE on Soviet-made vacuum cleaners—
treated Soviet designs as part of an international continuum in which the merits of indigenous 
products were considered alongside those of foreign brands such as the Siemens Rapid (West 
Germany) or the British Electrolux.66 
<FIG. 1.5 ABOUT HERE> 
But not all was well in the kingdom of Soviet appliance production. The 1962 report in 
Dekorativnoe iskusstvo complained of the anachronistic form of some consumer durables, while a 1965 
VNIITE study found problems in existing practice and identified contradictions in Soviet planning and 
production. It criticized the state standard (GOST) for vacuum cleaners for ignoring the basic 
requirements of technical aesthetics as well as other specifications that represented the “best world 
standards.”67 VNIITE also addressed matters of styling.68 For styling and semiotics were not entirely 
absent from Soviet appliances, in spite of the continued insistence among aesthetic reformers that the 
guiding principles of the socialist manufactured object were rationality, economy, and fitness for 
purpose. Space iconography was widely used to represent the future of the Soviet home. As the 
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punchline of the Rabotnitsa cartoon exemplified, domestic “woman-operated technology” to “help 
women” manage their domestic burden was associated metaphorically with the dream of space flight 
and its triumphant realization. The association between successes in space and on the home front was 
established through the styling as well as the naming of appliances. A woman could have her slice of the 
glories of the space age as she cleaned her home with a vacuum cleaner styled and named after a rocket 
(Raketa) or a planet (Saturnas) (fig. 1.6). Other appliances used the trope of harnessing nature’s power, 
such as the vacuum cleaner Vikhr’ (Whirlwind) or the refrigerators Sever’ (North) and Sibir’ (Siberia).69 
The ZIL, Rolls Royce of refrigerators, needed only to refer to the factory where it was produced.70 
<FIG. 1.6 ABOUT HERE> 
There was a contradiction, however. Although the new ZIL model praised in 1962 had gone 
rectilinear and rational, many Soviet fridges—such as the ZIL featured in the glossy multivolume 
Tovarnyi slovar’ (Trade Dictionary) just the previous year—were still streamlined, a style intimately 
identified with American capitalism since the 1930s and possibly appropriated from the United States at 
that time along with the refrigeration technology. Presented like a royal portrait, with a red carpet and 
plush curtains drawn back to unveil it, the bulbous fridge represented luxury and plenty with its applied 
aluminum script and a large handle that metaphorically equated its door with that of a car.71 Other, lesser 
fridges also reproduced this streamlined style until the midsixties. Thus this stylistic materialization of 
capitalism entered millions of Soviet citizens’ homes and found a place in their daily routines, caressed 
and cared for every day. If material things shape consciousness, Soviet consumers received a dose of 
capitalist relations every time they opened the fridge door or ingested its contents. 
VNIITE turned its critical scrutiny on such contradictions. The form of some Soviet vacuum 
cleaners demonstrated that “their creators strove to achieve a purely external similarity with their name” 
without reference to their functions and mechanisms. The “plastic” (sculptural) treatment of the Raketa 
imitated the form of a rocket, while the external detailing and body of the Chaika (Seagull) conveyed the 
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idea of flight and dynamism; yet speed was hardly one of the salient properties of vacuum cleaners!3 
VNIITE was not amused by such playful excesses. “The wholly unjustified styling [lit. ‘form-creation’] 
in the production of such functional domestic appliances as vacuum cleaners leads to excessive 
expenditure of materials and complicates the technology of production. Thus nearly eight tons of metal a 
year are expended on the arrow-shaped decorations applied to the body of the Chaika.”72 The point of 
VNIITE’s study was to impose rationalist, modernist principles and good taste. It condemned 
streamlining, and styling in general, on modernist, rational grounds. These norms corresponded to the 
moral-economic repudiation of excess and superficial aesthetic flourishes launched by Khrushchev in 
1954 with regard to Stalinist architecture and extended by reformist aesthetic experts to all aspects of the 
material environment.73 The beauty of socialist machines resided in a transparent relation between form 
and function. 
In the capitalist West, the report emphasized, superficial differences between products enabled 
consumer goods to function as markers of distinction and social stratification. Yet in the Soviet Union, 
too, the range of vacuum cleaners currently in production was “irrationally large,” according to the 
report, because it was not justified by any substantive differences among the available products. In their 
construction, mechanisms, and technical specifications there was little to distinguish the Buran 
(Snowstorm), Vikhr, Raketa, and Chaika. These models produced by different enterprises were set apart 
only by small variations in their external appearance. In the state socialist planned economy there was 
little point in competition between these brands, VNIITE admonished, since it merely wasted resources. 
Recommending rationalization, the VNIITE report rejected the play of difference and denied the 
importance of semiotics, fundamental to marketing in the West, which lay precisely in such 
                                                 
3 This may show awareness of Western critiques of streamlining, which Van Doren presented in order to 
repudiate: “‘Why,’ some critics say, ‘should static objects be streamlines? Ridiculous!’” Industrial 
Design, 196. 
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distinctions.4 
Such criticisms reveal tensions between different agencies and authorities responsible for 
durables production, indicating a split between intelligentsia theorists, working in central research 
institutes, and practitioners on the ground, dealing with localized situations in individual enterprises, and 
between aesthetic specialists and managers or trade specialists. The latter were concerned above all with 
fulfilling the plan and—following the Kosygin reforms of 1965—with turnover. Although VNIITE 
rhetorically identified its rationalist arguments with the superiority of socialist over capitalist goods, they 
were not unique to socialism. In the West, too, culturally powerful lobbies objected strongly to 
streamlining and Populuxe. Represented by the Council of Industrial Design in Great Britain and the 
Museum of Modern Art in the USA, they struggled for modernist good taste against what they saw as 
the excess, kitsch, and vulgarity of mass consumerism.74 They, too, like the Soviet modernizers of the 
material environment, sought to define and propagate principles of “good design” and for similar 
reasons: to raise the level of popular taste and educate the masses to appreciate what the experts 
appreciated. Both rested on a kind of environmental determinism: the belief that good design improved 
users, while bad design corrupted not only their taste but also their morals. So the modernizers on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain had more in common with each other than with the peddlers of Populuxe. 
Yet the very fact that styling already existed in Soviet production—even to be critiqued—
requires explanation. Causes may include “uncritical assimilation” of foreign models, as well as tensions 
between blueprint and practice on the ground and the limits of the aesthetic specialists’ authority.75 In 
addition we need to know more about the work of designers embedded in enterprises, about the system 
of bonuses for bosses, including in defense sector enterprises, and about the implementation of Aleksei 
                                                 
4 Tomas Maldonado, future president of the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design 
(ICSID), had similarly proposed in 1961 that Soviet design had a potential advantage over that under 
capitalism; free from the framework of competition and the priority of merchandizing, it could address 
other tasks neglected in the West. Tomas Maldonado (1961), cited by Kenneth Frampton, “The 
Development of a Critical Theory,” in Ulm Design: The Morality of Objects, ed. Herbert Lindinger 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991) 152. With thanks to Thomas Cubbin. 
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Kosygin’s reforms in regard to appliance design and production.76 As these reforms raised the 
importance, in assessing performance, of turnover rather than fulfillment of the production plan, factory 
bosses also had to get consumers to buy the goods. Thus we should also consider the role of the Soviet 
consumer and her “consumption junctions,” to use Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s term for the conjunction of 
conditions in which choices between competing technologies are made. Even though, under state 
socialism, resources were planned and allocated centrally, decisions about consumption were taken by 
individuals in their specific, located circumstances, in ways that eluded central planning.77 In the USSR, 
too, it was not only specialists and elites who made the sixties, but also mass consumers. 
Creating a Need, Producing Consumers 
In the West the styling and allure of commodities was about creating a market, producing consumers to 
fit the product, and perpetually stimulating demand through “panic for status.”78 Could there possibly be 
any such image culture in the Soviet sixties? Surely it was neither necessary nor desirable in the socialist 
shortage economy; nor was the semiotics of social stratification through consumption to be 
encouraged?79 
The circulation of images of the technologically saturated Soviet home and the modern Soviet 
khoziaika (housewife) operating domestic machines can certainly be explained by other reasons, 
including the demands of ideology and national prestige and their role in the Cold War competition over 
images of modernity. For the purpose of the Soviet Union’s international standing it might suffice, 
however, to project the image of a Soviet appliance-enhanced lifestyle without necessarily investing in 
substantiating it on a mass scale: the “logic of models” that characterized Stalin-era consumer culture 
might continue undisturbed.80 
However, the post-Stalin regime was also committed to achieving the actual penetration of 
technology into the homes of the masses as part of the project of achieving abundance and building 
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communism in a period characterized by the party as one of “scientific-technological revolution.” The 
mechanization of all forms of labor was part of the Soviet state’s modernizing agenda. Appliance use in 
the home would develop scientific consciousness and free up women’s time and energy for productive 
labor and social work.81 That the penetration of technology was a priority is confirmed by investment in 
its production (even if inadequate) and by the assignment of production capacity in the military-defense 
sector to this effort. 
This agenda—to get technology into everyday life—might explain increased production norms 
for appliances. But what need could there be in a shortage economy to promote the sale of consumer 
durables? If the things were produced and properly distributed, wouldn’t they sell themselves? Why 
should design matter in what is assumed to have been a seller’s market? Why should Soviet enterprises 
take the trouble and resources to brand and advertise their products? And why the range of product 
names, packaging, and logos? With regard to appliances, can the Cold War binaries have blinded us to a 
reason similar to the role of advertising in the West: the creation of a market? The production of needs is 
a question that is not usually asked in the Soviet context. Western commentators on the Soviet Union 
have traditionally focused on problems of shortage and failure to satisfy demand for consumer goods.82 
Like all consumer goods, domestic appliances were in short supply, hard to get hold of, and expensive. 
This was a shortage economy, and there could be no cause to cultivate the consumer or even to study 
demand and consumer psychology when state production capacity was unable even to meet existing 
needs. 
As noted, however, while consumption within rational norms (that is, within limits attainable on 
a mass scale in the current state of production) was promoted, these norms were conceived as dynamic. 
Soviet economic theorists envisaged that, as the national economy grew, so would the population’s 
rational needs and legitimate demands. The growth in demand for new types of goods, for higher-quality 
and more expensive consumer durables, was thus an important index of progress.83 But in the early to 
mid-1960s appliances were unfamiliar and costly commodities in a culture where people possessed few 
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manufactured goods and were only just emerging from what Goldman calls a “loaf-to-loaf existence.” If 
it mattered to get technology into citizens’ homes, it was necessary to persuade them to part with their 
small but increasing disposable income and to become consumers of these things. 
The shortage paradigm assumes a permanent seller’s market. There are indications, however, 
that Soviet economists did not share this confidence. Measures were introduced to stimulate demand for 
high-end durables. As early as 1959 the credit system for higher-priced goods was expanded to help 
make appliance acquisition possible.84 Consumer behavior was also changing, as economists noted: 
some emerging elements of a buyers’ market were observed as early as 1960, including shoppers’ strikes 
and accumulations in warehouses of unwanted goods.85 This situation engendered—or legitimated—
new concern with studying consumer demand and with promotion and advertising, especially of 
expensive goods.86 The so-called “Liberman economic reforms,” discussed during the Thaw and 
introduced in part by Kosygin, after Khrushchev’s ouster, proposed to make production more directly 
answerable and responsive to demand and thereby to make the consumer an agent in the rationalization 
and modernization of consumer goods production.87 While terms such as market forces had to be 
tactfully avoided by using euphemisms such as commodity-money relations, already by the early to mid-
1960s a more prominent role was ascribed to consumers and their choices as a driver of production, at 
the level of both planning (quantities and assortment) and design, and the 1965 reforms made turnover 
and profitability a performance indicator of enterprises.88  
Significantly, VNIITE’s first research projects included a market survey of domestic appliances 
(in collaboration with Komsomol’skaia pravda’s Institute of Public Opinion Research). It gathered and 
analyzed consumer opinions on small electrical appliances such as radios, televisions, and vacuum 
cleaners, attending particularly to the external appearance rather than the technical specifications.89 An 
institute specifically dedicated to market research, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for the 
Study of the Population’s Demand for Consumer Goods and Market Prices (koniunktura) for Trade (or 
VNIIKS) was also established in 1965 under the USSR Ministry of Trade. This was a sixties institution 
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par excellence, existing only from 1966 to 1972 and falling from favor after 1968, discredited along with 
the Kosygin reforms by association with the Prague Spring.90 
The shortage paradigm also assumes that the need for appliances was already there, fully formed, 
and lurking unsatisfied: a “pent-up demand” as Goldman put it.91 But that demand had first to be 
produced. The history of technology demonstrates that to achieve penetration a technology must not 
only be available but become necessary; a need must be created, whether for a luxury status symbol, or 
for a normal element of modern urban living. Appliances, like all technologies, are cultural artifacts, 
embedded in practices, habitus, attitudes, moral economies, and the circulation of images and 
meanings.92 A range of values, often unconsciously held, come into play that might support acquisition 
or resist it: aspirations to modernity and attachment to novelty or resistance to change; notions of thrift 
and proper housewifery, gender roles and identities; desire for distinction or fear of standing out; 
culinary practices and ideas of national specificity; or handed-down perceptions of the physical effort 
required for a good wash.93 A need for consumer durables was not an inevitable consequence 
determined by the possibility of that technology; it required also a cultural shift. As in the West, 
advertising and design had an acknowledged function to increase turnover, especially of higher-end 
goods.94 Was styling also a means to embed the need for appliances by making the commodity an 
advertisement for itself?95 
Becoming Consumers 
In the USSR appliances came, in the course of the long 1960s, to be regarded as a normal need and even 
an entitlement. My informants’ narratives of their appliance consumption in the decade following their 
move to new apartments around 1959–64 indicate how, at varying rates, refrigerators and washing 
machines came to seem first desirable, then normal, and were later upgraded or duplicated. But we shall 
look at two cases that show that this was no “whiggish inexorable succession of technologies”; it had to 
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overcome resistance on various grounds.96 
Ivan (b. 1910), a former army officer (and as such, relatively well off and enjoying privileged 
access to goods), had lived in Ukraine for two years before moving to Kaluga, where he and his wife 
received a separate apartment around 1960–61 in a block for officers. He tells the story of acquiring 
their first refrigerator, a ZIL: 
That was when I was still serving in the army. There was this officer from Moscow who went on leave. I 
say to him, “You know what—bring me back a refrigerator.” That was in 1957. In January he came back 
from leave and sent it by rail. So . . . he arrived and we received it. Nobody had one yet in the town. They 
said, “Well, what do you need that for?” That was when we were in the Ukraine, it is hot there after all. I 
tell them what it is for, but it was winter, January. But then they saw what it was [he laughs] and started 
buying [them]. They also began—to buy, that is. 
The year 1957, when Ivan ordered his refrigerator, was early in the history of Soviet appliance 
dissemination. Domestic refrigerators were hard to get hold of and in short supply, but it would be 
wrong to explain this difficulty entirely as a matter of “pent-up need.” Even though the summers were 
hot in this Ukrainian town, there was no preexisting consciousness of a need for such equipment, 
according to Ivan. People continued to use the preindustrial cooling methods they were accustomed to, 
such as standing jars in cold water in the bathtub, or using deep cellars and the cavity between the 
external and internal walls or windowpanes (fig. 1.7).97 Ivan’s purchase was met with bafflement. 
However, exposure to this technology taught other residents to want refrigerators too. 
<FIG. 1.7 ABOUT HERE> 
Ivan played the role of a vanguard of demand. It is not perhaps coincidental that he was a 
military officer, implying a status and obligations similar to those of a party activist or Komsomol 
member. Just as the army and military-industrial complex (where most appliances were in fact 
produced) were a technological, modernizing force, Ivan saw himself as having a social duty to carry the 
torch of modernization.98 
Statistics showing increasing penetration of appliances are corroborated in my informants’ 
“consumption biographies,” which also tell us how they experienced the material changes in their 
everyday lives and how these corresponded to changes in their sense of themselves. Their stories mark a 
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shift—for which, as in Western Europe, the sixties are the decisive decade—from what Goldman calls 
“loaf-to-loaf” existence to the accumulation and replacement of appliances and other consumer durables, 
even before they are used up. Lewis Siegelbaum cites the prediction of writer Leonid Likhodeev: “Do 
you have a TV, do you have a refrigerator? So there will be a car.”99 My informants shared in this 
collective ascent of the Soviet consumer. One Kaluga woman tells about how she used to have only just 
enough money to pay for food on a day-by-day basis. In the course of the sixties, after moving into a 
new apartment, she, like many others, began to acquire appliances, starting with a television, then 
graduating to a vacuum cleaner, a refrigerator, a washing machine, a tape recorder, and, by the 1970s, a 
car.100 Changing conceptions of what is necessary and what is excessive or extravagant luxury, which 
emerge clearly in my informants’ accounts from their first appliance acquisition to the replacement, 
upgrading, and duplication of appliances, mark the passage toward a consumer culture. 
The process was not, however, as inexorable as Likhodeev suggested, as if the first bite of the 
apple of appliance consumption “led” inevitably to further purchases. Once again the question “Who 
made the sixties?” requires us to consider the agency of the individual consumer and the nexus of 
conditions at the consumption junction. The acquisition of appliances remained a matter of choices and 
household priorities about how to dispose income or whether to cross moral or legal lines.101 These 
choices began with the decision to prioritize the home over other spaces and objects of consumption, a 
choice that was conventionally gendered. Aleksandra, for example, tells how she had to make the down 
payment on their cooperative apartment behind her husband’s back because he wanted to save up for a 
car. 
Many of my interviewees recall their appliance consumption junctions in precise detail. 
Affordability and availability—price, spending power, and production levels—were clearly important 
considerations here, as were quality and benefit to their everyday lives. Legislation, sumptuary taxation 
or pricing categories, and the designation of certain goods as eligible for purchase on credit—all means 
by which the state sought to direct the consumption junction—also contributed to whether or when 
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people would buy appliances and what they meant in the system of things (including whether they 
counted as luxuries or necessities).102 But there were also social and cultural or ideological reasons why 
some technologies took hold faster than others and why some were never fully assimilated.103 
While appliances entered the vocabulary and iconography of modern Soviet living, the line 
between legitimate needs and excessive desires was still contested in the Soviet sixties. In the 1950s, 
appliances had the aura of luxury (as we saw, as late as 1961, Tovarnyi slovar’ was presenting the 
refrigerator as a VIP, giving it the red carpet treatment and associating it with a preindustrial luxury 
commodity, rugs).104 During the long sixties its status slid from luxury to necessity, as the boundary 
between reasonable and excessive demands, rational and superfluous technologies, shifted, reflecting, in 
part, changes in the capacity of production.105 That boundary remained uncertain, however, especially 
among older people. The elements of an emergent consumer culture were still in tension, in the 1960s, 
with preconsumer society’s handed-down sumptuary morality and valued practices of thrift, and with 
the intelligentsia’s disdain for material comfort.106 The sixties were a watershed, a period of struggle and 
negotiation between old and new cultures of consumption. My informants today often reveal continued 
adherence to aspects of preaffluent society’s morality of consumption, contrasting their own thrift and 
nonacquisitiveness favorably with that of a daughter-in-law representing the postsocialist present. In the 
1960s, however, it was they who represented the young generation of new homemakers and fledgling 
consumers. 
Technology choices were also a matter of gender and generational power relations within the 
household, subject to negotiations and power struggles over priorities. The acquisition of a television set 
was seen as a purchase for the household as a whole. Informants often say they got it “for the old 
people” or for the children.107 Although most women in the Soviet Union worked and contributed to the 
household income, battles arose between the sexes and between generations over the choice of 
technology, and these revealed shifting attitudes toward appliance consumption. Rima, in Kazan’, tells 
of how she and her husband came into conflict with the older generation, her parents-in-law, who lived 
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in the same apartment. The younger couple wanted to buy labor-saving appliances. She relates her run-
ins with her mother-in-law over the purchase of a vacuum cleaner, a relatively inexpensive and 
accessible appliance. 
Did you have a vacuum cleaner?  
Not yet at that time. No. . . . We only bought one probably in the seventies. What did we buy it for first? 
We began to redecorate the apartment ourselves. And it was inconvenient to use brushes, it takes a long 
time to paint, to whitewash. But we were told that it worked well to do it with a vacuum cleaner. And we 
bought a spherical vacuum cleaner. I think we also got that from Moscow, you couldn’t get them here. 
And then we started to vacuum-clean. I remember there was a whole row over it here—that a woman 
doesn’t work and goes and buys a vacuum cleaner to boot. That it is, after all, meant to save women’s 
labor.108 
 
Gender ideology (including a normative conception that good housekeeping, industriousness, and thrift 
are essential qualities of a good woman), generational differences, and resistance to the use of household 
finances to alleviate the younger woman’s domestic labor played a part in this conflict. Although Rima 
worked, her mother-in-law evidently regarded her as spoilt and lazy and, in spite of widely circulating 
representations, also considered a vacuum cleaner unwarranted luxury rather than a necessary aid for a 
working woman. When they finally bought a vacuum cleaner in the 1970s it was already a “normal” 
item of Soviet household inventories, even if not yet readily available outside the metropolis. Even then, 
the primary purpose of the purchase was not to “save her domestic labor,” in accordance with public 
discourse’s rhetoric of liberating women from drudgery—meanings that Rima and her mother-in-law 
were evidently aware of—but to spray-paint the walls (a common use for Soviet vacuum cleaners but 
one that was scripted out in the West as the technology stabilized.) 
The purchase of a washing machine also met with resistance. They first bought a Volga 7, a 
cylindrical model (fig. 1.8). It wasn’t exactly conducive to laziness: “You had to heat the water, then 
pour it in.” But her mother-in-law objected: “She can do the wash herself, why does she need a washing 
machine?” Rima’s story demonstrates the clash between the values of two generations within a single 
household. Rima and her husband desired a modern lifestyle with novelties and gadgets and new 
technologies, but “The old people wouldn’t allow anything then. . . . We tried, if some novelty appeared, 
to buy it. Even if it was very difficult. If we had lived separately of course it would have been better. We 
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could have bought anything. But as it was we had to ask permission. And she [mother-in-law] wouldn’t 
agree. For whatever reason they were always opposed.” 
<FIG. 1.8 ABOUT HERE> 
Moreover, the benefits of a washing machine were not convincing.109 Ivan and his wife, although 
early persuaded of the need for a refrigerator, were more skeptical about the washing machine. It was 
she who resisted it. “Well, after all, that also involved manual labor, to wring it out is heavy.” Ivan adds: 
“She kept refusing: ‘Why? I’ll do it all by hand.’ But we said that it was necessary to make the transition 
[perekhodit’, i.e. to technology].” Ivan and his wife were not afraid of being seen as conspicuous 
consumers, as the refrigerator story above reveals; on the contrary, they seem to have enjoyed their 
status as the vanguard of modern consumption. His wife’s resistance was at least to some extent due to 
the limitations of early Soviet washing machines and the quality of the wash; it was questionable how 
much or what kind of labor they saved, as they still had to be manually filled and drained of water and 
the heaviest part still had to be done by hand. Was the labor it saved even worth the space it took up in 
the small apartment?110 Asked whether the manual wringer washing machine was convenient, Ivan’s 
wife replies: “No. But we were young then and I was more or less healthy, so of course I was happy.” 
More recently, however, they had replaced their old machine by a fully automatic one that did the whole 
process. 
If it mattered to enterprises and state authorities to get appliances into people’s lives and homes, then 
individuals had to be encouraged to choose technology. The adoption of technology by individual Soviet 
consumers was not a matter of pent-up need or inexorable progress determined by technological and 
scientific advances. Demand was produced in part through the actions and policies of the state’s agents: 
through the development and increased production of technologies for the home, through their increased 
presence in everyday life, and through their representation in public culture as an inalienable attribute of 
the modern Soviet person, a necessity rather than a luxury. Did styling and branding also play a part in 
producing these meanings and overcoming resistance? Did refrigerators and vacuum cleaners perhaps 
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need to change their image and become more functional and less luxurious in appearance before people 
like Rima’s mother-in-law could be persuaded to adopt them? Did design professionals acknowledge 
this as part of their brief? Were appliances in the Soviet context just tools and nothing more, or was their 
primary function semiotic? If we can answer these questions we can begin both to define the role of the 
modern industrial design in the USSR and to calibrate the Soviet transformation, somewhere between 
the 1960s and the 1980s, into a consumer culture and to answer the question “Who made the Soviet 
sixties?” 
Published representations and oral history provide plentiful indications that appliance 
consumption carried social meanings. As noted, the styling of vacuum cleaners, identifying them with 
the Space Age, or that of refrigerators, associating them with automobiles, suggests that semiosis was 
not irrelevant, even in the planned economy. The currency of appliances as signs of status, affluence, or 
pull—even if they failed to fulfill their nominal function—was also part of contemporary visual culture. 
A cartoon in Krokodil showed a refrigerator on a balcony in the snow, pointing to its redundancy: it 
added nothing to the natural chilling effect of winter weather. Its only function was for show: it had been 
installed on the balcony to maximize its display and status value. 
From the point of view of state authorities and specialist agents (ideologues and image makers), 
household technologies were a necessary part of the image of modernity and prosperity. The reasons 
citizens might have for deciding to purchase a fridge may partly have coincided with these authoritative 
ones: it was seen as part of a modern lifestyle, conferring the social status associated with urbanity, and 
saving labor by making it no longer necessary to shop every day for perishables. But fridges also had 
other, demotic meanings in excess of these official ones. They were part of the coping strategies for 
surviving the vagaries of distribution, thus cushioning households against the lapses of the state and 
giving them greater control over their food supply by allowing them to buy perishables in bulk if they 
appeared on sale and to store privately grown produce.111 Reasons for buying appliances also varied 
according to status, education, income, and geography, and they changed in the course of the 1960s to 
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the 1980s as Soviet consumer culture established itself. Desire for domestic technology still marked 
Rima, in the older generation’s eyes, as lazy, selfish, and hankering after unwarranted luxury. But for 
Ivan, his Moscow refrigerator was associated with his social status as an officer and with his sense of 
himself as a force for progress and innovation; it represented his self-identification with the public 
values of the modernizing state. The corrupt, acquisitive factory manager lampooned in the Krokodil 
cartoon above also invoked appliances’ positive associations with modernity, culturedness, and social 
leadership to justify his accumulation of the latest consumer durables. For Rima’s generation (or some 
of them) machines in the home represented convenience but also novelty, sensation, and status and 
projected their sense of themselves as resourceful, innovative, and modern. One novelty Rima and her 
husband did manage to get past the older generation was a television set. Not content with merely 
possessing a TV, they found a way to adapt it to watch in color, to the envy of their neighbors. 
Typically, this novelty had to be hunted down in Moscow and involved technical know-how; a kind of 
film of the same format as the screen had to be installed inside the set, which had then to be reassembled 
and retuned. But it was worth it: all their friends would come to their apartment to watch. “It caused a 
real sensation.”112  
Values, status, and social distinctions attached to having appliances in general, but some were 
more equal than others. Informants retrospectively identify certain types and brands of appliances as 
having been more “prestigious”—a Maiak record player, for example.113 Certain technologies such as 
washing machines—expensive and hard to get—remained a sign of social status into the 1970s and also 
marked urban/rural distinctions.114 In the early 1960s the acquisition was a first, but subsequently my 
informants began to replace their first models by newer or better ones. As they grew more prosperous 
and as appliances became more “normal” they drew finer distinctions, of the sort VNIITE would have 
dismissed as “irrational.” Refrigerators were particularly important because of their large visual 
presence in the home, and certain brands were especially desirable, not solely because of their functional 
qualities and reliability, but also because of their appearance and social image. Nina D., trying to recall 
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the name of her first refrigerator, dismissed the interviewer’s suggestion that it might have been a ZIL, 
the beauty queen of Soviet refrigerators according to the 1962 report on the aesthetics of appliances 
cited above: “No that wasn’t for the likes of us.”115 The fine superficial distinctions between brands, 
which VNIITE criticized as irrational in a planned economy, had become markers of social 
stratification. 
To return to my initial question, then: Laktionov would probably have been the wrong choice of 
artist to commission for a sixties update of his domestic interior. A photographer or graphic designer 
would have been more in line with emerging tendencies in Soviet visual culture, with its emphasis on 
technological modernity. The style would also lack Hamilton’s playful identification with the visual 
techniques of mass entertainment, advertising, and media, favoring rather the impression of sober 
documentary truth.116 Nevertheless, some at least of the same symbols of Tomorrow would be bound to 
appear in a Soviet sixties version: the television and vacuum cleaner, joined perhaps by a ZIL 
refrigerator. Two decades later, it would include not one but two: an old curvilinear cream model, 
purchased in the 1960s, placed on top of a new, self-defrosting model (fig. 1.9).117 
<FIG. 1.9 ABOUT HERE> 
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